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Abstract
Technology evolution in the field of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) will affect the Air Traf-
fic Management (ATM) performance regarding
to new military and civil applications. UAS, as
new airspace users, will represent new challenges
and opportunities to design the ATM system of
the future. The goal of this future ATM network
is to keep intact (or improve) the network in terms
of security, safety, capacity and efficiency level.
On the other hand, most UAS are, at present, de-
signed for military purposes and very few civil
applications have been developed mainly because
the lack of a regulation basis concerning their cer-
tification, airworthiness and operations. There-
fore, UAS operations have always been solutions
highly dependent on the mission to be accom-
plished and on the scenario of flight. The gen-
eralized development of UAS applications is still
limited by the absence of systems that support
the development of the actual operations. More-
over, the systematic development of UAS mis-
sions leads to many other operational risks that
need to be addressed. All this elements may de-
lay, increase the risk and cost in the implementa-
tion of a new UAS application.
1 Introduction
There is great pressure in order to define the rules
under which UAS will be able to fly inside non-
segregated airspace. This initial effort has been
already started, mainly due to military interest,
leaded in Europe by EUROCONTROL in the
UAV-OAT Task Force. UAV-OAT recently dis-
tributed the first public draft and collected com-
ments about the document [2]. A similar process
will eventually happen for civil UAS, thus lead-
ing to the real introduction of UAS as an avail-
able product for science, business, etc. EURO-
CONTROL and the FAA have similar philosophy
about the integration problem: UAS should oper-
ate transparently to ATM and other airspace sys-
tems and users. However, even when restricted
to the OAT scenario with an approved set of rules
there are a number of open issues that must be
addressed in order to obtain a successful UAS in-
tegration. Such situation will be extremely aggra-
vated when UAS operational rules are introduced
for the civil operation of UAS.
At present, the majority of manned flights
correspond to commercial aviation dealing with
persons/goods point to point transportation. On
the contrary, the majority of potential UAS flight
types may significantly differ from common
manned flight types. Most common UAS po-
tential mission is surveillance duties, requiring
flexible and uncertain flight plans directly exe-
cuted by computers with some supervision from
UAS pilot. It is true that nowadays there are sev-
eral general aviation manned aircraft performing
this kind of missions, but its operation is mainly
a man-directed process with little direct control
from computers.
The introduction of this new type of un-
manned traffic should not greatly affect ATM op-
erations. However, UAS operation will be af-
fected to large extends by its interaction with
ATCs. Modern autopilots support pilots with re-
planning capabilities, but only for point to point
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operations. Mission re-planning of surveillance
UAS due to the integration in the non-segregated
ATM systems will require lots of automated sup-
port for the UAS Pilot if a timely response by him
is required.
It is also true that we can imagine in the fu-
ture scheduled cargo or even eventually passen-
ger UAS flights. This means that UAS integra-
tion in civil airspace will balance in some way
the “general aviation flight types” with the “com-
mercial aviation flight types” affecting to ATM
operations and involved systems. However, the
real integration of such type of flight will not oc-
cur in the short term, and therefore its study can
be delayed until further UAS operational experi-
ence is gained.
Nowadays, no assessment exists dealing with
the necessity to coordinate UAS almost auto-
matic operations, but monitored by human pilots,
with automatic or human operations performed
by other airspace users and by the different ATM
actors. Moreover, with the advent of civil UAS,
the degree of automation will significantly in-
crease because civil users wonŠt be able to invest
in extremely complex ground stations requiring
multiple operators. Therefore the future integra-
tion of civil UAS should take into account rela-
tively low cost but high automated vehicles.
Industry is currently designing and imple-
menting the first family of sense-and-avoid sys-
tems [3]. Legally speaking these systems will
allow the rightful operation of UAS in non-
segregated airspace. However, the separation
provision and collision avoidance is hierarchi-
cally divided from the ATC to the pilot-in-
command to the UAS autonomous operation.
Therefore it is true that sense and avoid is a tech-
nical topic that must be successfully resolved, but
it is also true that the UAS - ATM - Manned
Aircraft triple interaction must be also addressed
from a technological point of view, but also from
an operational point of view.
2 Assessment of UAS Operational Issues
2.1 Regulation and sense&avoid
Nowadays the introduction of UAS into non-
segregated airspace if suffering by a number of
both legal and technological factors. It is gener-
ally understood that the clarification of these is-
sues will firmly clarify the future path of UAS
inside the general aviation.
From a legal perspective, regulation needs
to be clarified and consolidated at many levels
(ICAO, EASA, FAA, etc.) [2, 10, 1]. Cur-
rently there is a high level of activity on this
topic, that eventually will lead to the consolida-
tion of a regulatory framework for UAS. Also, the
assignment of radio-electrical spectrum to dedi-
cated command & control and mission commu-
nications is being addressed [6], and eventually
decisions will be taken at the upcoming ITU con-
ference.
From a technological perspective, new com-
munication devices will be needed to cope with
the potential spectral bands assigned to UAS op-
eration. Additionally, I huge effort will be needed
to clarify how technology will cope with the see
and avoid mandatory obligation on UAS. A large
amount of research is currently being carried out
to solve this particular aspect of UAS technology.
However, even though all this aspects are re-
ally relevant and are acting as bottlenecks on
UAS development, the thesis of this work is that
the magnitude of the previous problems is pre-
cluding the investigation of further aspects that
will become relevant as soon of the first set of
limiting factors is resolved.
2.2 Mission-oriented UAS
UAS have a great potential to support a
wide variety of aerial monitoring applications.
UAS may substitute manned aerial resources
for cost/availability reasons; may cohabit with
manned aerial resources in order to complement
them; and even may allow addressing new moni-
toring scenarios in which manned platforms have
never been introduced due to accessibility, com-
plexity or risk. All these potential may be lost if
all inherent risks in the UAS technology are not
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properly identified and addressed (see Figure 1).
The goal of UAS is to substitute manned air-
craft in a number of aerial work scenarios. This
is the first fundamental issue to take into account,
UAS will not operate as point to point aircraft.
Instead, UAS will possibly loiter over certain ar-
eas that may change over time. The main objec-
tive of the UAS Pilot in Command (PiC) being
to attend to the commercial, security or scientific
mission that the UAS is developing. Any change
on the desired mission-oriented flight plan due to
external interferences (ATC, traffic, etc.) will re-
quire the UAS PiC to redesign its operation to
retake the tasks at hand prior to the undesired in-
terruption. Therefore mission support is required
at the UAS in order to automate the operation, but
also on the ground so that the PiC or the operator
could manage the operation.
The operation of the UAS goes beyond ba-
sic point to point navigation. The UAS pilot will
need to manage the trajectories that the vehicle
will need to follow. This flight management
may include the selection of alternative trajecto-
ries to implement departure and approach oper-
ations, or the selection of specific routes to re-
spond to an optimum route selection.
Contingency reaction is also one of the main
bottlenecks that will need to be addressed. In
case of any type of contingency, from the vehi-
cle or due to a conflict, an immediate reaction
is mandatory in order to don’t miss any precious
second. Due to the limited situational awareness
of the PiC, we advocate for pre-planned contin-
gency reaction schemes associated to the flight
plan itself. Pre-planning for contingencies offers
two main advantages: simplifies pilot decisions
avoiding wrong selections due to the pressure of
the circumstances, but also permits an automated
contingency response in case the communication
link between the ground and air segments is lost.
The desired goal by the UAS community is to
allow them to operate in non-segregated airspace.
Therefore, UAS will need to interact with the
ATC and with other aircrafts if operating in VFR
airspace. Which and how are the flight intentions
that UAS should provide to ATM actors? How
and when these intentions will remain valid for
Fig. 1 Overview of UAS Operational Open Issues
the UAS and how they will have to be re-planned
in flight in order to accommodate variations on
the final mission goals or to cope with variations
induced by external events? Human factors are
also considered crucial here. How the PiC will
interact with the systems in order to react to these
external events and how mission re-planning will
be supervised by them?
Flight plan definition according to actual
standards is considered to be quite vague; there-
fore ATC will have little detailed information
about the intentions of UAS carrying out surveil-
lance operations. Most details about actual oper-
ations will be defined prior and during the flight
upon negotiation between both parts. On the
other hand it will be assessed how sustained UAS
operations will affect the current CFMU systems
and which measures will be needed to accommo-
date this new kind of operations.
Especially interesting is also determine the
amount of overload to PiC and eventually to the
ATC and determine the type of tools that may
help reducing such overload. In particular, tools
to help keeping the situation awareness of the
UAS pilot in order to clearly keep track of all PiC
- ATC interaction, and tools to properly react to
the ATC requests, conflicts or contingencies with
immediate update of the UAS flight-plan and/or
intentions.
3 UAS Mission Oriented Architecture
The UAS System Abstraction Layer (USAL) is
the set of available services running on top of the
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Fig. 2 Overview of the Flight Services Category.
UAS system architecture to give support to most
types of remote sensing UAS missions [4]. A
number of specific services have been identified
as “a must” in any real life application of UAS.
The idea is to provide an abstraction layer that
allows the mission developer to reuse these com-
ponents and that provides guiding directives on
how the services should interchange avionics in-
formation with each other. The available services
cover an important part of the generic functional-
ities present in many missions.
The USAL services are divided in four cat-
egories accordingly to the role they play in the
overall UAS operation: Flight Services, Mission
Services, Awareness Services and Payload Ser-
vices.
Flight Services are those in charge of the
UAS flight operation. This includes the autopilot
management, flight management, flight monitor-
ing for the PiC and the flight contingency man-
agement.
Mission Services are those in charge of de-
veloping the actual UAS mission, controlling the
payload and the area of surveillance, processing
or saving the earth observation information and
showing it to PiC or operator.
Awareness Services are in charge of the safe
operation of the UAS with respect terrain avoid-
ance and integration with shared airspace.
Payload Services are lower level services, not
necessarily available to the end-users. They are
like device-driver, this is, the facility services that
abstract the details to access to the input, output
and communication devices.
3.1 Flight Services
Flight services are a set of USAL applications de-
signed to properly link the selected UAS autopi-
lot with the rest of the UAS avionics [8]. The
main services operated are the Virtual Autopilot
Service, the Flight Manager Service, the Con-
tingency Service, the Flight Monitor Service, the
Flight Plan Monitor Service etc. (see Figure 2):
The Virtual Autopilot Service (VAS) is a sys-
tem that on one side interacts with the selected
autopilot and is adapted to its peculiarities. The
VAS abstracts the implementation details from
actual autopilot users. From the mission/payload
subsystems point of view, the VAS is a service
provider that offers a number of standardized in-
formation flows independent of the actual autopi-
lot being used.
The Flight Plan Manager (FPM) is a ser-
vice designed to implement much richer flight-
plan capabilities on top of the available autopilot
capabilities. The FPM offers a virtually unlim-
ited number of waypoints, waypoint grouping,
structured flight-plan phases with built-in emer-
gency alternatives, mission oriented legs with a
high semantic level like repetitions, parameter-
ized scans, etc. These legs can be modified by
other services in the USAL by changing the con-
figuration parameters without having to redesign
the actual flight-plan; thus allowing the easy co-
operation between the autopilot and the UAS
mission.
The Contingency Management services are a
set of services designed to monitor critical pa-
rameters of the operation (like battery live, fuel,
flight time, system status, etc.). In case contin-
gencies are detected, actions will be taken in or-
der to preserve the security and integrity of the
UAS: from flight termination, mission abort or
system re-cycle.
The Electrical and Engine Management ser-
vices are a set of services designed to gather data
on the operation of the UAS electrical system and
the propulsion system. Such information is re-
layed to the Contingency Manager to take the ap-
propriate decisions.
The Flight Termination System is a system
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outside the USAL architecture, and it is in charge
to deploy a parachute system in case the Con-
tingency Manager requires it; also the parachute
may be deployed in case a major USAL failure.
The Flight Plan Monitor is the HMI interface
on the ground that provides high level flight man-
agement services that will exploit the advanced
capabilities offered by the UAS oriented flight
plan provided within USAL.
3.2 Awareness Services
A UAS is a highly instrumented aircraft and has
no pilot on board. With these conditionings the
more suitable flight rules for a UAS are IFR
(Instrumental Flight Rules), however for remote
sensing missions the advantages of UAS systems
is precisely its capacity for flighting at any alti-
tude, where VFR (Visual Flight Rules) aircrafts
are found. UAS must relay on its instrumentation
equipment to properly inform the pilot in com-
mand on the ground or substitute the pilot ca-
pacities in VFR conditions. The awareness ser-
vices (see Figure 3) are responsible of such func-
tionalities. Flight Services are in charge of the
aircraft management in normal conditions while
the Awareness Services are in charge of monitor-
ing surroundings conditions and overtake aircraft
management in critical conditions. In this case
mission services come to a second priority, until
flight conditions become again normal.
The Awareness data fusion (ADF) is a service
designed to collect all available data about air ve-
hicles surrounding our UAS, terrain and mete-
orological conditions. All this information can
be obtained either by on board sensors or even
through an external provider.
The Tactical/Strategic Conflict Detection ser-
vice will analyze the fused information offered
by the ADF in order to detect potential collision
conflicts with objects/terrain/bad climate. De-
pending on the type of conflict, different types
of reaction procedures will be activated. While
reaction is executed it will keep monitoring than
the conflict is really being avoided.
The Tactical/Strategic Reaction services, will
implement avoidance procedures according to
the severity of the conflict. Tactical reaction
is designed in such a way it can overtake the
Flight Plan Manager in order to execute a rad-
ical avoidance maneuver. Once completed, the
FPM will regain control. An strategic reaction
will command the FPM to slightly modify its se-
lected flight plan trying to avoid the conflict but
at the same time retaining the original mission re-
quested by the Mission Manager.
Fig. 3 Overview of the Awareness Services.
4 UAS Flight Plan Specification
The flight plan is a document that contains the
navigation instructions for the UAS [7, 5]. In
our proposal the flight plan is a self-contained
description of the main flight plan, but also con-
tains options for take-off and landing operations
as well as alternatives for emergency situations
(see Figure 4).
Stages constitute high-level building blocks
for flight plan specification and are used to group
together legs that seek a common purpose. They
correspond to flight phases that will be sequen-
tially executed: Taxi, TakeOff, Departure, En-
Route, Mission, Arrival, Approach and Land.
A stage may have more than one final leg,
for instance, a take off stage may end at differ-
ent points depending on the selected take off di-
rection. Also, a stage may have more than one
initial leg as could be the case for departure pro-
cedures that start at different positions depending
on the chosen take-off direction.
A leg specifies the flight path to get to a given
waypoint. In general, legs contain a destination
waypoint and a reference to their next. Most
times legs will be flown in a single direction, but
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Fig. 4 A flight plan is composed of stages, legs, waypoints and parameters to be used by the FCS.
within iterative legs reverse traversal is also sup-
ported.
There are four different kinds of legs. Basic
legs that specify basic tradditional primitives; It-
erative legs that allow for specifying repetitive se-
quences; Intersection legs that provide a junction
point for legs which end at the same waypoint, or
a forking point where a decision on what leg to fly
next can be made; and Parametric legs that spec-
ify legs whose trajectory can be computed given
the parameters of a generating algorithm, e.g. a
scanning pattern.
A complex trajectory may involve iteration,
thus the inclusion of iterative legs. An iterative
leg has a single entry (i.e. its body can be entered
from a single leg), a single exit and includes a
list with the legs that form its body. Every time
the final leg is executed an iteration counter will
be incremented. When a given count is reached
or an specified condition no longer holds the leg
will be abandoned proceeding to the next one.
Intersection legs are used in situations where
there is more than one possible path to follow and
a decision needs to be made. This leg type con-
tains a list with the different alternatives and a
condition for picking one of them. Intersection
legs are also used to explicitly indicate where two
or more different paths meet. Together with para-
metric and iterative legs, intersection legs provide
a powerful means for adapting the flight as best
suited to the ongoing mission circumstances.
With parametric legs complex trajectories can
be automatically generated from a reduced num-
ber of input parameters. If the actual values of
these parameters change, the resulting trajectory
will be dynamically recomputed. Eventually a
complete enough library of different parametric
legs will be available so that a wide range of mis-
sions can be performed. With the use of para-
metric legs two goals are achieved. First, com-
plex trajectories can be generated with no need
to specify a possibly quite long list of legs. Sec-
ond, the UAS path can dynamically adapt to the
mission requirements.
Analysis of the potential contingency situa-
tions and planning the correct reaction is a critical
task to be carried out by any airplane to guarantee
its safe operation. Pilot’s reactions to any kind of
incidences that may occur in-flight, like engine
malfunctions, loss of electrical power, hydraulic
failure, unexpected weather, etc; are critical and
will determine the fate of the flight in case such
contingency occurs.
5 In Flight Contingency Management
Contingency management relates to the capabil-
ity of the system to monitor its health status,
detect anomalies and react accordingly. Dur-
ing a pre-flight phase (also known as flight-
dispatching) all reasons that may lead to a devi-
ation from the expected UAS behavior are iden-
tified and assigned a pre-defined reaction. Once
the UAS is in flight, its operation is continuously
monitored to check whether its behavior is main-
tained within nominal status. If some deviation is
detected a pre-defined reaction is triggered caus-
ing other USAL flight and mission services to
modify its operation.
Contingencies can be grouped according to
the four categories established by the USAL.
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Flight Contingencies which may have an impact
on the UAS ability to execute the flight plan.
Some examples include the UAS performance
not satisfying certain minimums, estimated flight
time for completing the mission exceeding UAS
autonomy or any malfunction in flight-critical
subsystems. Payload Contingencies in case a
given payload element fails some predefined ac-
tions may need to be taken. These category refers
mainly to sensors and other hardware elements
used for acquiring data. Mission Contingencies
when a component belonging to the mission cate-
gory, e.g. storage or data processing, fails and the
system is unable to go back to normal operation.
Awareness Contingencies when the required lev-
els of situational awareness are not guaranteed.
Depending on the criticality of the contin-
gency the response may consist in trying to fix
the problem, perform the mission in degraded
conditions or a partial or complete cancellation
of the mission. The USAL introduces a contin-
gency architecture (implemented by the Contin-
gency Manager)[5], that is built by two compo-
nents: the Health Monitor (HM) and the Contin-
gency Intelligent Control (CIC). The HM gathers
and processes the information needed to take a
contingency decision. The CIC is in charge of de-
ciding the proper response or set of responses for
dealing with a particular contingency. The CIC
classifies the contingency into three categories:
Minor, Hazardous and Catastrophic.
Catastrophic Contingencies includes all con-
tingencies which interrupt the UAS flight or a
safety landing. In practice it means loss of the
platform. For example: a structural defect in
the fuselage, in the autopilot or a flight manage-
ment failure. In order to respond to these con-
tingencies, it is considered an emergency compo-
nent aggregated to our architecture called Flight
Termination System (FTS). This system will be
triggered by the catastrophic category. The FTS
commonly will be composed by parachute sys-
tem [9]. The main objective is to guarantee that
the potential impact to the ground of the UAS will
not fatally damage any person or infrastructure.
Hazardous Contingencies includes all contin-
gencies which reduce the aircraft airworthiness.
This lack of airworthiness may put in danger the
mission success or sometimes develop into catas-
trophic contingency. Also this category is com-
posed by those contingencies which make im-
possible the mission objectives, as for example
any failure in the payload needed for the mission.
This component has different reactions in front of
these contingencies.
Go Home: The UAS will be sent directly
to its final destination and the mission will be
aborted. Go Home by Alternative Flight Plan:
The UAS will flight back home. If the emergency
situation in critical enough, it may be needed an
alternative path which description is composed
by alternative paths; these paths are managed by
the Flight Plan Manager. Go Better Alternative
Runway: A UAS flight plan presents different
landing possibilities. Due to its little size a lot of
airfields may be suitable enough to ensure safety
landings. This response is focused in finding the
best alternative runway. Go Closest Alternative
Runway: A landing site is needed as soon as pos-
sible in order to preserve the UAS platform. Go
to Flight Termination Field: If the UAS cannot
arrive to the closest runway, it must find some-
where to terminate the flight. The flight Plan
Manager is the main service to implement haz-
ardous contingency reactions.
The Minor Contingency category corre-
sponds to anomalies or failures that interfere with
normal mission execution without completely
preventing it.
All flights require a single main flight plan,
but additional emergency flight plans may be
present to support the previously introduced con-
tingency reaction scheme. The main difference
between the main flight plan and emergency
plans is that while the main plan includes the
whole set of the aircraft’s operations from take-
off to landing, emergency plans only cover the
finishing stages of a flight. The reason for not in-
cluding all possible stages in an emergency plan
is that they only get executed when something
goes wrong during the mission, i.e. when the air-
craft is already flying.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper has reviewed a number of open is-
sues that still limit the integration of UAS in non-
segregated airspace. These limiting issues related
to the fact that UAS operate as mission-oriented
vehicles rather than point to point transportation.
In order to address this factors, an UAS ori-
ented architecture has been introduced. This ar-
chitecture supports the development of mission-
oriented flight-plans with embedded alternatives
to manage departure and approach operations.
The architecture also supports embedded contin-
gency reactions so that the PiC can supervise
semi-automatic reactions, or the UAS can auto-
matically react as pre-planned in case the link
between ground and air segment is lost. Future
work will address the analysis of the automatic
reaction to both tactical and strategic aerial con-
flicts, and how the mission-oriented flight path
can be retaken after conflicts are resolved.
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